Redistributing to the sick: How should health expenditures be integrated into the tax system? by Billy Jack
May 28, 2008
Redistributing to the sick: How should health expenditures be
integrated into the tax system?￿
Abstract
I study the optimal joint taxation of income and health expenditures in a model in which individuals
di⁄er in their wage-earning ability and in their health status. First-best redistribution based on potential
wage rates and health status is not feasible, and tax payments must be based on endogenous incomes and
health expenditures. Within a class of quasi-linear schedules, the conditions for an optimal tax/subsidy
system depend on the own and cross price compensated elasticities of demand for leisure and health in
a way that generalizes the standard results from the optimal linear income tax literature. Numerical
simulations are employed to illustrate the sensitivity of tax and subsidy rates to the correlation between
health status and wages. In these simulations, the e⁄ective marginal income tax rate optimally increases
with health expenditures. However, the welfare gain from optimally incorporating health expenditures
into the tax system appears to be very limited, compared with the e⁄ect of properly designing the income
tax itself.
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There is widespread support in many countries for public intervention in health care delivery
markets on redistributive (as well as e¢ ciency) grounds, either in the form of universally available
public health care or through subsidized care targeted to certain populations. At the same time,
there is a growing literature on the interactions between health and income inequality, recently
surveyed by Deaton (2001) and Case (2001). These studies examine links between the level and
distribution of income and/or consumption and health outcomes, and investigate, inter alia, the
impact of income redistribution on health status. Exactly how a health care subsidy regime
should be designed, how large the subsidy should be, and how it should be related to the income
tax system, is not necessarily obvious. While the importance of the tax treatment of health
care and health insurance, particularly in the US, has long been recognized (e.g., Feldstein, 1973,
Pauly, 1986), and policymakers continue to propose tax incentives to address perceived health
care and insurance needs (e.g., as reviewed by Pauly and Herring, 2002), a formal integration of
health status into a model of income taxation is required to properly design such interventions.
This paper aims to provide such a framework.
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) showed that as long as individuals di⁄er only in their income
earning ability and preferences are separable between leisure and consumption of other goods
(so demands for other goods depend only on their prices and the individual￿ s earned income),
then commodity taxation cannot increase welfare above the level attained under an optimal non-
linear income tax. Under the standard conditions, this theorem implies that health expenditures
should not a⁄ect tax liability.1 More generally however, if demand for health care depends on
earned income and wage earning ability, then its consumption can be used to relax the incentive
constraint constraining the optimal income tax (Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1982). This may occur,
for example, if individuals di⁄er by health status which in turn partially determines wage rates
1 A similar conclusion is drawn by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979).
1and health care demand. If individuals with poor health have lower wages (ability), then as long
as health expenditure is income elastic, it can be used as an "indicator" of ability, and thereby
increase the e¢ ciency of redistribution from high wage to low wage individuals.
A second reason it might be desirable to integrate health care utilization into a redistributive
income tax system is that people with similar wage rates may have very di⁄erent health needs.
Indeed, while income and health status may be correlated, there is no doubt wide variation in
the conditional distribution of health needs. Even in the absence of income earning heterogeneity,
there is a rationale for redistribution from the sick to the healthy, simply because the budget sets of
the former are smaller than those of the latter. In principle this could be e⁄ected by a health care
subsidy (as suggested by Nichols and Zeckhauser, page 376). However with wage heterogeneity,
if health care demand is income elastic, some of the bene￿ts of such a subsidy would accrue to
individuals with high wages. The extent to which a health subsidy redistributes from healthy to
sick must then be compared to the extent to which it potentially redistributes from poor to rich.
To investigate this trade-o⁄, the model developed in this paper allows individuals to di⁄er on
two dimensions - their income earning ability and their health status - and investigates the way tax
liability should be related to endogenously determined incomes and health expenditures. Just as
the distortionary e⁄ects of non-lump-sum income taxes limit the desirable degree of redistribution,
distortionary e⁄ects of health expenditure subsidies may also limit the extent to which the healthy
subsidize the sick. We abstract from all potential market failures in both the health sector and
the labor market.2
A growing number of contributions to the mechanism design literature (e.g., Mussa and Rosen
(1978), Wilson (1993), Armstrong (1996), and Rochet and ChonØ (1998)) have considered models
with multi-dimensional type spaces, in which agents￿characteristics di⁄er in more than one di-
mension. Boskin and Stiglitz (1977), Blomqvist and Horn (1984), and Rochet (1991), made early
2 This is the normal approach in the one-dimensional optimal income tax literature, where, in particular,
employers are assumed to be able to observe an individual￿ s marginal product costlessly. Correspondingly, in the
health sector, I assume there is no adverse selection, and individuals with greater needs pay higher prices.
2contributions to optimal tax theory when individuals have multi-dimensional types. These have
been complemented more recently by papers by Cremer and Pestieau (1996), Cremer, Lozach-
meur, and Pestieau (2002), and Boadway, Meite-Monteiro, and Marchand (2002). Cremer and
Pestieau (1996) extend Rochet￿ s (1991) analysis of income taxation and social insurance to the
case when preferences are not quasi-linear. Cremer et al. (2002) model optimal income taxation
in the presence of retirement decisions when individuals di⁄er by labor productivity and health
status, where the latter determines the disutility of remaining in the labor force. The model
analyzed by Boadway et al. (2002) is the closest in spirit to that of the current paper. While it
includes a richer description of the insurance market (allowing for adverse selection), it permits a
less general tax instrument.
Blomqvist and Horn (1984), Rochet (1991), and Cremer and Pestieau (1996) examined the use
of a public, tax-￿nanced, insurance system as a means of redistributing well-being when individuals
di⁄er in their risks of su⁄ering a loss.3 The general outcome of this analysis is that if there is a
negative correlation between wages and risk (so that on average the rich have better health), then
a public insurance system should complement an optimal redistributive tax system. Bad health
(or generically, a realized loss) is simply used as an imperfect, but nonetheless valuable, signal
of an individual￿ s ex ante risk of falling ill, so that transfers to sick people, say through a public
health insurance system or another form of social insurance, are welfare improving. Importantly,
there is no deadweight loss associated with these transfers. For example, in Cremer and Pestieau
individuals are always perfectly insured, being able to purchase actuarially fair insurance to cover
any losses not borne by the social insurance system. Similarly, in both Rochet and Cremer and
Pestieau, the size of the loss incurred is not a⁄ected by the public (or private) insurance coverage
- that is, there is no hidden information moral hazard. Cremer and Pestieau do acknowledge
the possibility of hidden action moral hazard (wherein insurance a⁄ects the probability of a loss
3 In Blomqvist and Horn, and Rochet, the loss was associated with an illness. In Cremer and Pestieau is it a
generic income loss. In all papers, the size of the loss is ￿xed and constant across individuals.
3occuring), but provide only a cursory discussion.
On the other hand, one aspect of the health care sector that has received a tremendous amount
of attention is the impact of insurance on the demand for health care, and the ine¢ ciencies that
arise due to overconsumption of health care when it is subsidized.4 Similarly, subsidization of
health insurance, whose demand is elastic, results in distortionary costs of excessive coverage. In
order to focus on these e¢ ciency costs most simply, the paper uses a model with no uncertainty
and considers the demand for health care (as opposed to health insurance). Individuals di⁄er not
in their risks of falling ill, but in their (certain) health needs.5 As explained in the presentation
of the model below, while the price of health care is the same for all individuals, they can be
thought of as facing heterogeneous prices for health improvement. As long as the price elasticity
of demand for health care is between zero and one (an empirically robust observation, ___),
for a given income, individuals with greater health needs will spend more on health care services
(although they might not buy more health improvement).
A second way in which the model of the current paper di⁄ers from some of the related literature
is with respect to the information structure. First, individuals￿private information is non-trivially
two-dimensional. In contrast, in Cremer and Pestieau (1996), although individuals di⁄er on two
dimensions (wage and probability of a loss), there is perfect (positive or negative) correlation
between the two, so individuals￿characteristics are e⁄ectively distributed over a one-dimensional
subset of R2. In our model, wages and health status are imperfectly correlated, if at all, and
individuals￿characteristics are distributed over a two dimensional region. Secondly, the type
spaces used in many of the papers referred to above have been limited to a binary support, while
we allow for continuous distributions of types (in both dimensions).6
4 See, e.g., Pauly (1986).
5 In fact, the model can be applied to any situation in which the prices of a particular good, in addition to
leisure, vary across individuals. Education may be another example, in which the cost of adding to one￿ s human
capital is a function of one￿ s ability. In such a case, the distribution of wages and education prices would be likely
to exhibit a high degree of correlation.
6 An advantage of the binary support assumption is that optimal non-linear tax schedules are relatively easy to
characterize.
4We do not attempt to solve the two dimensional mechanism design problem that underlies
the optimal non-linear taxation of labor income and health expenditures Instead, we restrict
ourselves to a subset of admissible tax functions that are characterized by four components: a
universal lump-sum grant, a constant marginal tax on income, a constant marginal subsidy to
health expenditures, and an interaction term. The interaction term represents a tax payment
that is a ￿xed proportion of income times health expenditure.7 This functional form allows
ask to ask whether e⁄ective marginal income tax rates should decrease with health expenditures,
or conversely, whether the e⁄ective subsidy to health expenditures should fall with income. The
functional form also includes, as special cases, income tax deductions and credits for health ex-
penditures.8
An advantage of the current model is that it treats health expenditures and income symmet-
rically. Indeed, one might wonder why, if a public health system were optimal (as in Rochet,
1991), would a fully socialized workforce not also be optimal. The obvious answer is that the
distortionary e⁄ects on labor supply would be too great. This paper attempts to account for the
distortionary e⁄ects of national insurance (or full subsidization of medical care) on health care
utilization. It allows us to address the issue of how income tax rates should vary (if at all) with
health expenditures, or conversely, how health expenditure subsidies should vary (if at all) with
income.
The formulae we derive for the four components of the optimal tax function generalize those
of the standard linear income tax model with one dimension of heterogeneity. Simulations of the
model are used to investigate the quantitative signi￿cance of using health expenditures as a redis-
tributive instrument. Initially, tax schedules are restricted to be strictly linear (so the interaction
7 From a practical standpoint, the marginal income tax and health subsidy can be implemented on a real-time
basis (i.e., through income tax withholding and health care price subsidies). However, the payment based on the
interaction between income and health spending would necessarily be calculated at the end of the tax year, when
individuals complete their income tax returns.
8 Stiglitz and Boskin (1977) have addressed the issue of whether medical expenses should be creditable or
deductible against an income tax, although within a restricted framework. Similarly, Atkinson (1977) examined
the issue of housing subsidies within an optimal tax model, but assumed that one dimension of heterogeneity was
observable by the government.
5term is constrained to be zero). Health expenditures are either subsidized or taxed, depending
on the correlation between health status and income earning ability. They are subsidized only
if the correlation between wages and poor health status is su¢ ciently negative. Indeed, even if
the correlation between these underlying characteristics is zero, it is optimal to put a small tax on
health expenditures, since health expenditures are correlated with income, even if health status is
not. When the correlation is positive, the case for a tax is strengthened, since then high health
spending (associated with greater health needs) is an even more informative signal of relatively
high earning ability, and a tax on spending reduces the reliance on the distortionary income tax
instrument.
The simulations suggest that when income and health expenditures are subject to a linear
tax schedule, the optimal income tax rate is about 30%, across wage-health status correlations.
On the other hand, the optimal health subsidy rate ranges from +10% to -10%. These are not
insigni￿cant subsidy rates. However, we also present a measure of the welfare impact of optimally
incorporating health expenditures in this linear fashion. While introducing a simple linear income
tax (with no health subsidy) improves social welfare by an amount equivalent to a budget increase
of about 5 percent of GDP, over the range of wage-health status correlations examined the greatest
welfare gain (which accrues when the correlation is high) is equivalent to a budget increase of
between just 0.02 and 0.04 percent of GDP. For intermediate levels of correlation, the gain is
truly in￿nitessimal, being as small as 0.00004 percent of GDP for modest correlations. This
set of simulations thus suggests that the gains to incorporating health expenditures into the tax
system could be quite limited. Of course, more extensive variations in the parameterization of the
simulations may reveal cases in which the gains are more substantial. Similarly, including health
spending in a tax system that is not otherwise optimally designed, could have a larger e⁄ect.
Finally, we ask what sign the interaction term should have in an optimal quasi-linear tax
system. Within the class of cases considered in the simulations, welfare is increased by introducing
6a small positive tax on the product of income and health expenditures.9 Thus at the optimum,
the e⁄ective marginal income tax rate increases with health expenditures, and the subsidy to (or
tax on) health spending falls (increases) with income.
The next section sets out the government￿ s welfare maximization problem. Section 3 derives
the government￿ s ￿rst order conditions. Section 4 provides some interpretation to the ￿rst order
conditions, although the relatively large number of tax parameters (four) makes such interpretation
more di¢ cult than in the standard linear income tax model. In light of this, section 5 presents
the numerical simulations, and section 6 concludes.
2 Optimal taxation with wage and health status hetero-
geneity
Individuals consume three goods, health (h), leisure (l), and a general consumption good (c). Each
individual has an endowment of one unit of leisure, and labor supply is L = 1 ￿ l.10 Preferences
are described by the suitably di⁄erentiable utility function u(h;c;l). Individuals face di⁄erent
wage rates, w, and health prices, p, and are distributed on a set ￿ in R2
+, with a continuous and
di⁄erentiable joint probability density function f(w;p).
The interpretation of leisure and consumption are standard, but a brief discussion of health
is warranted. The good h can be thought of as "healthiness", which is produced by purchasing
health care services, x. The price of health care services is normalized to unity. The health
production function, which transforms health care services into health outcomes, is linear, but the
productivity, ￿, of health care varies across individuals depending on their health status: that is,
h = ￿x. The cost of acquiring healthiness h is thus h=￿ = ph, where we de￿ne p = 1=￿.
Taxes are levied on the basis of earned income, Y = wL and health expenditures, Z = ph,
9 Clearly optimally introducing another tax instrument available cannot reduce welfare. The result of interest
is that the sign of the interaction term should be positive.
10 It may be interesting to introduce an endowment of health that di⁄ers across individuals.
7according to the schedule
T = ￿G + tY ￿ sZ + ￿(Y:Z)
where G is a universal lump-sum grant, and t, s, and ￿ are marginal tax rate parameters. Let
￿ = fG;t;s;￿g be the set of tax parameters. An individual with wage rate w and health price p
takes the tax parameters as given and chooses her consumption bundle according to
max
h;c;l
u(h;c;l) s.t. c = G + (1 ￿ t)Y ￿ (1 ￿ s)Z ￿ ￿Y Z (1)
yielding income Y = w(1 ￿ l), health expenditures Z = ph and indirect utility v(w;p;￿).





where ￿ is a strictly increasing weakly concave function of utilities. This maximization is carried
out subject to a revenue constraint, R0. That is,
G + R0 =
Z
￿
(tY (w;p) ￿ sZ(w;p) + ￿Y (w;p)Z(w;p))f(w;p)dwdp
where we have normalized the population to one. Given a tax system de￿ned by parameters ￿,
some individuals may choose not to work. This set of individuals is described in Appendix 1.
3 Optimality conditions
Let us follow the standard approach (e.g., Sheshinski (1972), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, page
405)) and derive the ￿rst order conditions for the government￿ s maximization problem. The




(￿(v) + ￿[tY ￿ sZ + ￿Y Z ￿ G ￿ R0])f(w;p)dwdp (2)
where ￿ is the Lagrange multiplier on the revenue constraint.
83.1 Lump-sum grant
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(tY (w;p) ￿ sZ(w;p) + ￿Y (w;p)Z(w;p))
as the additional revenue collected due to an increase in an individual￿ s income, m. Following






where ￿(w;p) is the private marginal utility of income of an individual with wage w and health
price p. Equation (3) then reduces to
b = 1. (4)
That is, given the other tax parameters, the lump-sum component should be adjusted to the point
at which the marginal social valuation of an additional dollar, across all consumers, is equal to
the marginal cost (one dollar).
3.2 Income tax rate, t














































u represent the change in labor supply and health demand, re-
spectively, in response to a change in t, keeping the individual on a ￿xed indi⁄erence surface in
R3. Note that @v
@t = ￿￿Y . If we de￿ne the e⁄ective marginal income tax and health expenditure













f(w;p)dwdp = 0 (5)
9where "L is the compensated elasticity of labor supply with respect to the net wage, b w = w(1 ￿











Similarly (see the appendix for further discussion), "hb w is the cross elasticity of health demand











Note well however that ￿ and ￿ are each functions of endogenous choices by the individuals, and
vary according to w and p (in particular, ￿ = t + ￿Z(w;p) and ￿ = s ￿ ￿Y (w;p)) and so (5) is
di¢ cult to simplify further.
3.3 Health expenditure subsidy, s
The tax system allows for a direct credit for a fraction s of incurred health expenditures. By



















































f(w;p)dwdp = 0; (6)
where "h is the compensated elasticity of demand for health with respect to the net price of health,
b p = p(1￿s+￿Y ), and "Lb p is the compensated elasticity of labor supply with respect to this price.
3.4 The interaction term, ￿
Finally, through ￿, the tax system allows the marginal tax rate to vary with health expenditures,
or equivalently, it allows the rate of credit for health expenditures to vary with income. The ￿rst






























11 Own price elasticities are denoted with single subscripts, while cross price elasticities have the corresponding
quantity and price subscripts.
10Using @v







































































(￿Y "L ￿ ￿Z"hb w)
(1 ￿ ￿)
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4 Interpretation of the FOCs
It is imperative to keep in mind that, as in most of the optimal tax literature, the four ￿rst
order conditions (3), (5), (6), and (7) provide only implicit de￿nitions of the optimal four tax
and subsidy rates. Direct interpretation is di¢ cult in this case, but some qualitative insights are
possible.
We have already given an interpretation of the FOC for G, equation (3) - the lump-sum
component should be adjusted to the point at which the marginal social valuation of an additional
dollar, across all consumers, is equal to the marginal cost (one dollar). There is some reason to
expect that the optimal lump-sum grant may be smaller than in the standard linear income tax
problem, and perhaps negative. Suppose for instance that the wage distribution is degenerate,
and that individuals di⁄er only in their health prices. In this case, we would expect the optimum
to be characterized by a lump-sum tax (G < 0) plus a positive marginal health expenditure
subsidy (s > 0). To the extent that the optimum tax structure when both wages and health prices
are heterogeneous is some combination of the two degenerate cases, it is possible (although not
obvious) that jGj could be relatively small. This intuition back￿res however if the optimal health
expenditure subsidy is negative. Now both income and health expenditures are tax sources, and
11they can feasibly ￿nance a larger lump-sum bene￿t. (See the simulations below.)
Equations (5) and (6) for the optimal e⁄ective income tax rate and health subsidy rate can be
compared to the standard condition for the optimal linear income tax rate in a two-good model.
For example, in the absence of a health good, and when individuals only di⁄er according to their








where the variables have corresponding meanings to those in this paper (and where the integral
is over the one-dimensional domain of wages). Assuming b and Y are negatively correlated, the
tax rate should be higher the greater this negative correlation, and the less elastic is the supply
of labor by those with high incomes.
If in our model we restrict attention to the optimal choice of the income tax and lump-sum







Y "LdF = ￿cov[b;Y ]. (9)
But ￿ = t + ￿Z = t, so this condition is identical to (8), except for the range of integration. We
can infer that if the pattern of health status increases the marginal social value of income of the
poor relative to the rich (for example when health status and wages are negatively correlated),
income tax rates should be correspondingly higher.
The cross elasticity terms in (5) and (6) mean that the simple (though implicit) expressions
for the optimal e⁄ective tax and subsidy rates similar to (9) are not forthcoming. However,
(5) can be interpreted as showing how the e⁄ective marginal income tax rates (which vary with
health spending) are chosen to balance the positive welfare e⁄ects of reductions in the dispersion
of income against the negative distortionary e⁄ects of the taxes, including their e⁄ects on labor
supply and on health demand. Equation (6) has a corresponding interpretation. To explore this
















In the standard linear income tax model, the thing that constrains the optimal tax rate to be
less than one is the distortionary impact this has on labor supply. This e⁄ect is captured by
the denominator in (8). If s > 0 and health and leisure are Hicksian substitutes ("hb w > 0),
condition (10) indicates that the net distortionary impact is smaller, so the tax rate t can be
higher. When health expenditures are taxed at the optimum (s < 0), the income tax rate should
be lower. On the other hand, if health expenditures are taxed, s < 0, and health and leisure are
Hicksian complements ("hb w < 0), the distortionary impact of the income tax is exacerbated, and
the tax rate t should be lower.
Intuition for whether the health expenditure subsidy should be positive or negative can be
obtained from equation (11). Indeed, if we constrain the income tax rate to be zero, (11) shows
that the subsidy should have the same sign as the covariance between expenditures and the social
marginal valuation of income, cov[b;Z].12 When the tax rate is positive, the optimal subsidy
is (algebraically) increased as long as health and leisure are Hicksian complements (i.e., as long
as health and labor supply are Hicksian substitutes, "Lb p < 0). That is, when health and leisure
are Hicksian complements, if s is optimally positive without an income tax, it tends to increase
when an income tax is available, but if s is optimally negative without an income tax, it tends to
become smaller in absolute value when the income tax instrument is introduced. The reverse is
true if health and leisure are Hicksian substitutes.13
12 Recall "h < 0.
13 This discussion is related to Gahvari￿ s (1994) analysis of cash versus in-kind (e.g., health) transfers in the
presence of a linear income tax. In that paper it was found that the labor supply e⁄ects of the two transfer
mechanisms depend on whether leisure and the transfered good (health) are Hicksian substitutes or complements.
In the current model, health is not transfered directly in-kind, but its optimal subsidization (or taxation) is a⁄ected
by the same features of preferences.
13Finally, equation (7) describes a similar trade-o⁄between redistribution and distortionary costs
of non-zero marginal tax rates. The ￿rst order condition is of the form ￿cov(Y Z;b) ￿ I = 0,
where I is the integral term on the right hand side of (7). To gain some intuition for the sign
of ￿ at the optimum, one might start by evaluating this expression at ￿ = 0. In the presence of
income e⁄ects on the demand for health care, income and health spending are themselves likely
to be more closely correlated than wages and health status, suggesting a relatively large negative
covariance between their product and b. If this covariance is larger than the value of the integral
term, then ￿ > 0 is optimal. It is clearly di¢ cult to be de￿nitive about the relative values of
these terms, but the fact that I is the di⁄erence between two components, might induce one to
expect ￿ to be greater than zero.14 If so, individuals with greater health expenditures would
face higher e⁄ective marginal tax rates (￿ = t + ￿Z), and individuals with greater incomes would
receive smaller e⁄ective marginal health expenditure subsidies (￿ = s ￿ ￿Y ). In the simulations
to follow, we ￿nd this to be the case.
5 Simulations
In this section we present a selection of simulation results that lend support to the intuition of
the preceding paragraphs. The utility function is assumed to be of the simple form




ensuring that health is a normal good, and that the share of income devoted to health care falls
with wealth. In the simulations that follow, we choose a range of health prices (p 2 (0;1)) and
wage rates (w 2 (10;100)), so that the income share of health care is about 12%. This is roughly
the share of GDP spent on health care in the US, but somewhat higher than the corresponding





















14distributed, conditional on falling in the ranges identi￿ed above.15 When they are negatively
correlated (￿ < 0 - see previous footnote), poor individuals tend to have greater health care
needs. With these parameterizations, individual health spending as a share of earned income
varies between about 5 percent (for those with high wages and low health needs) and 30 percent
(for those with low wages and high health needs) across the population. The elasticity of demand
for health care varies across individuals, but is approximately 0.5.
The government￿ s net revenue requirement (R0) is zero, and the welfare function is utilitarian
(￿(v) = v). As a benchmark, with s and ￿constrained to be zero, when ￿ = 0 the optimal income
tax rate is 30.1 percent. This tax system yields a welfare improvement over the no-tax outcome
equivalent to a uniform lump-sum payment to all individuals equal to 4.86 percent of per capita
GDP. An optimal linear income tax thus has a non-trivial impact on welfare.
Figure 1 presents simulation results for optimal income tax and health expenditure subsidy
rates for the case in which ￿ is constrained to be zero. (That is, income is taxed at a constant
marginal rate t, and health expenditures are subsidized at a constant marginal rate s.) As
predicted earlier, both rates are decreasing in ￿, the correlation between the health price and the
wage (recall that ￿ < 0 corresponds to the more likely case, in which lower wage individuals have
greater health needs - that is, face a higher price p of health). The optimal income tax rate
remains in a narrow range between 29 and 31 percent, except when ￿ > 0:625 (approximately).
Health expenditures are subsidized at the optimum only when ￿ < ￿0:3 (approximately): the
subsidy reaches nearly 11 percent when ￿ = ￿0:925, but it becomes a tax for values of ￿ greater
than ￿0:3. When ￿ = +0:925, this tax is nearly 10 percent.
Two calculations however suggest, at least for the parameterization chosen above, that incor-
15 In particular, the joint pdf is
f(lnp;lnw) = C exp
 
x2




where x = (lnp￿￿p)=￿p, and y = (lnw￿￿w)=￿w, and C is a constant of integration. The average health price is
0:37(= pmin +0:3(pmax ￿pmin), and ￿p is its log. Similarly, ￿w is the log of the average wage, which is assumed to
be 37(= wmin + 0:3(wmax ￿ wmin). Both standard deviations are one: ￿p = ￿w = 1. The correlation coe¢ cient
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Optimal health expenditure subsidy rate (right hand scale)
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Figure 1: Optimal tax and subsidy rates as functions of the correlation between wages and health
needs, in the case of a linear tax system, in which ￿ = 0.
porating health expenditures into the tax system could have a limited impact. First, we compare
the optimal income tax rates calculated above with those that would characterize an optimal lin-
ear tax system with s constrained to be zero. The results are shown in Figure 2, which con￿rms
that the tax rates are virtually identical in the two cases, and di⁄er discernibly only at extreme
correlations, and even then by less than one percentage point.
Second, it is possible to calculate the increase in the government￿ s budget (reduction in the
revenue requirement, R) that would allow an optimal linear income tax without a health expen-
diture subsidy to generate the same level of welfare as the optimal linear tax system with health
expenditures included. Figure 3 presents the results of these calculations, and shows that the
welfare gains are very low indeed.
Finally, the change in the Lagrangian associated with a small increase in ￿ above zero is
calculated, evaluated at the optimal linear income tax and health subsidy rates. The numerical
values of these changes are not presented here, but it is reported that over the full range of
correlations considered, the result was positive. Thus, introducing a small tax on the product of
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Figure 3: The welfare gain, measured as the equivalent budget increase as a percentage of GDP,
from optimally incorporating health expenditures into a linear tax system
17health care should thus face a higher marginal income tax rate, and conversely, those with higher
incomes should receive a smaller marginal health expenditure subsidy.
6 Conclusions
A health expenditure subsidy could be a useful redistributive tool if sicker people spend more
on health care than the healthy. On the other hand, high income people also spend more on
health care than those with low incomes, so such a subsidy would tend to favor the rich ahead
of the poor. Which of these two e⁄ects dominates in determining the appropriate tax treatment
of health expenditures depends on the correlation between health status and income, and the
elasticities of demand for health care and supply of labor. This paper has attempted to formalize
the trade o⁄ within a model that is simple enough to analyze using standard techniques from the
optimal (linear) income tax literature.
Optimal linear income tax rates are sensitive to the correlation between wages and health
status in a predictable fashion: if low wage individuals have on average worse health status, then
higher income tax rates are desirable. This can be thought of as stemming from the fact that
the pattern of health status exacerbates the inequality associated with wage di⁄erentials, thereby
increasing the social value of redistributing income from high wage earners to the lower paid.
Formally, the result derives from the fact that such correlation increases the covariance between
income and the social marginal value of income across individuals.
When a proportional health expenditure subsidy and an interaction e⁄ect are admitted, the
￿rst order conditions generalize those of the standard linear income tax model. Perhaps of more
interest however are the observations that can be drawn from the numerical simulations presented.
First, it is possible that in a system in which taxes paid are based only on income, the optimal
tax rate, while responsive to the correlation between health status and wages, varies little over a
broad range of such correlations. Second, despite this approximate invariance, the way in which
health expenditures are optimally incorporated into the tax system can vary widely with the
18health status-wage correlation. In particular there is no presumption that health expenditures
should be subsidized at the optimum - they may optimally be taxed. Third, as a corollary to
the previous observation, health expenditures should be treated non-trivially in the tax system
even if health status is uncorrelated with wages. This is simply because when health status and
wages are uncorrelated, health expenditures and incomes are likely to be positively correlated.
However, the quantitative signi￿cance of the impact of optimally treating health expenditures
within a linear tax system appears to be modest at best, at least for the simulations reported
here. Finally, the simulations suggest that any health expenditure subsidy should be reduced at
the margin for higher-income individuals. This conclusion is perhaps not surprising, but it implies
that individuals with greater health expenditures should face higher marginal income tax rates.
This conclusion may be somewhat less intuitive.
7 Appendix
7.1 Non-working individuals
This appendix describes the set of non-working individuals given a vector of tax parameters
￿ = (t;s;￿;G). In general these non-working individuals will constitute a set of positive measure,
and will usually have either low wages, high health prices, or both. To see this note that given ￿,
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Z + c + T = Y
T = ￿G + tY ￿ sZ + ￿Y Z
h ￿ 0; c ￿ 0; and 0 ￿ l ￿ 1
Assuming in￿nite marginal utility of consumption of each good at zero, of the four inequality
constraints only the last might bind. Substituting T into the ￿rst constraint, let ￿ and ￿ be the
Lagrange multipliers for the budget constraint and the inequality constraint l ￿ 1. The consumer￿ s
19Kuhn-Tucker conditions are then
uh = ￿p[1 ￿ s + ￿w(1 ￿ l)]
uc = ￿
ul = ￿w[1 ￿ t ￿ ￿ph] + ￿ and ￿(1 ￿ l) = 0
If l = 1, h and c are independent of the wage rate, and are determined by
uh(h;c;1) = p(1 ￿ s)uc(h;c;1)
and c = G ￿ (1 ￿ s)ph:
Denote these values of health and general consumption by b h(p;￿) and b c(p;￿) respectively. The
￿nal ￿rst order condition is then
J(w;p;￿) = wuc(b h;b c;1)[1 ￿ t ￿ ￿ph] ￿ ul(b h;b c;1) = ￿￿ ￿ 0
That is, all individuals with wages and health prices such that J(w;p;￿) ￿ 0 choose not to work.
It is straightforward to show that the locus of points w￿(p;￿) de￿ned by J(w;p;￿) = 0 is upward
sloping and that for all (w;p) such that w < w￿(p;￿) the individual does not work.
7.2 The Slutsky equation with a non-linear budget constraint
This appendix brie￿ y validates the use of the Slutsky equation with a non-linear budget constraint.
Around any consumption bundle (c0;h0;l0), the budget constraint in the individual￿ s maximization
problem (1) can be linearized as
c = G0 + b wL ￿ b ph;
where b w = w(1 ￿ t ￿ ￿ph0), b p = p(1 ￿ s + ￿wL0), G0 = c0 ￿ b wL ￿ b ph, and c0 = (G + w(1 ￿
t)L0 ￿ p(1 ￿ s)h0 + ￿wL0ph0). The compensated demand for good x = L;h is the optimal choice
of x(b w; b p;u0) in the program
min
h;L
c ￿ b wL + b ph s.t. u(c;h;l) = u0:





Locally, a change in the tax parameters, t, s, and ￿ a⁄ects the linearized budget constraint
through changes in b w and b p in the obvious way. Such a change also a⁄ects the position of the
budget plane (and not just its slope) through the term G0. However, this shift is irrelevant for
the purposes of calculating the compensated demand functions, which only depend on the slope
parameters (and u0). Thus, for example, the compensated derivative of labor supply with respect
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